Compliance with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code

We have pursued a consistent policy of compliance with the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (the 'Dutch Corporate Governance Code') that was published by the Tabaksblat Committee on December 9, 2003.

The Dutch Corporate Governance Code has its statutory basis in Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code and applies to companies with their registered office in The Netherlands whose shares are listed on a stock exchange either domestically or abroad. The Dutch Corporate Governance Code is based on the apply-or-explain principle and defines a company as a long-term form of collaboration between the various parties involved. The Board of Management and the Supervisory Board have overall responsibility for considering the interests, generally with a view to ensure the continuity of the enterprise. In doing so, the Company endeavors to create long-term shareholder value and the Board of Management and Supervisory Board should take account of the interests of the different stakeholders.

We support the principles of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code and we are almost fully compliant with its best practice provisions. It should be noted that we do not fully apply provisions II.2.2 (if the Company, notwithstanding best practice provision II.2.1, grants unconditional options to management board members, it shall apply performance criteria when doing so and the options should, in any event, not be exercised in the first three years after they have been granted), II.2.6 (a management board member shall give periodic notice, but in any event at least once a quarter, of any changes in his holding of securities in Dutch listed companies to the compliance officer or, if the Company has not appointed a compliance officer, to the chairman of the supervisory board), III.7.3 (containing a similar rule for Supervisory Board members) and II.2.7 (the maximum remuneration in the event of dismissal is one year's salary (the 'fixed' remuneration component)).

We do not apply provision II.2.2 in full on the options we granted to Mr. Scheepbouwer. We agreed with him, at the time of his appointment, that our Supervisory Board could annually grant him unconditional options. As contractually agreed at the time of appointment, these stock options are not linked to performance. We do, however, apply provision II.2.1 (options to acquire shares are a conditional remuneration component, and become unconditional only when the management board members have fulfilled predetermined performance criteria after a period of at least three years from the grant date) to our other members of the Board of Management. On November 6, 2007, the General Meeting of Shareholders approved the arrangement that Mr. Scheepbouwer, from 2008 and onwards, will be entitled to a long term incentive package based on remuneration in shares, replacing all his annual long term incentive entitlements from 2008 and onwards. For further information, see 'Remuneration and Organizational Development Report'. Furthermore, under the same premise that existing rights should be respected, Mr. Blok and Mr. Miller will receive more than one year's ('fixed') salary, contrary to provision II.2.7. Mr. Blok will receive one year's full salary (including short term bonus), whereas Mr. Miller will receive two year's fixed salary, including insurance and pension allowances. Both agreements correspond to the arrangements that were in place before they joined the Board of Management.

Under provisions II.2.6 and III.7.3, we require our members of the Supervisory Board and Board of Management to inform the compliance officer only once every year of their shareholdings in Dutch listed companies (other than KPN) rather than every quarter. We do not believe that there is any merit in informing the compliance officer on a more regular basis, as it does not address the real issue at stake, being that the members of these boards should dedicate sufficient time to their primary function and should not have conflicting interests. Besides, it only increases the administrative burden on both the members of these boards as well as on the compliance officer. Our position vis-à-vis all best practice provisions is available on our website, www.kpn.com, under the section Investor Relations, Corporate Governance and Risk Management and Internal Control.

We remain of the opinion that a governance regime should strike the right balance between transparency of rules and avoidance of bureaucracy caused by excessive detail in order for Dutch companies to remain internationally competitive. Application of sound corporate governance principles is important for a company but it should not be an end in itself. The true aim is to achieve and maintain a culture of honesty and integrity. This aim can, ultimately, be achieved only if the culture and behavior in a company are in all respects positive and transparent.